

More Efficient Algorithms for the NTRU Key Generation using the Field Norm

Thomas Pornin / Thomas Prest

NCC Group / PQShield

- 1 Motivation
- 2 The Classical Solvers
- 3 A New Solver based on Towers of Rings

Motivation

NTRU Lattices:

- Prevalent in lattice-based crypto
- Public key is $\mathbf{A} = [\mathbf{1} \mid \mathbf{h}]$, for $\mathbf{h} = \mathbf{g} \times \mathbf{f}^{-1} \bmod (\varphi, q)$.
- Private key is \mathbf{B} such that $\mathbf{B} \times \mathbf{A}^t = \mathbf{0} \bmod (\varphi, q)$

Some schemes only require a partial trapdoor $\mathbf{B} = [\mathbf{g} \mid -\mathbf{f}]$:

- Fiat-Shamir [Zha+17], encryption [Sch+17], FHE [LTV12; Bos+13]

Motivation

NTRU Lattices:

- Prevalent in lattice-based crypto
- Public key is $\mathbf{A} = [\mathbf{1} \mid h]$, for $h = g \times f^{-1} \bmod (\varphi, q)$.
- Private key is \mathbf{B} such that $\mathbf{B} \times \mathbf{A}^t = 0 \bmod (\varphi, q)$

Some schemes only require a partial trapdoor $\mathbf{B} = [g \mid -f]$:

- Fiat-Shamir [Zha+17], encryption [Sch+17], FHE [LTV12; Bos+13]

However, some schemes require a full trapdoor $\mathbf{B} = \left[\begin{array}{c|c} g & -f \\ \hline G & -F \end{array} \right]$:

- Hash-then-sign [Pre+17], IBE [DLP14], HIBE [CG17]
- More generally, anything based on trapdoor sampling [GPV08]

Motivation

NTRU Lattices:

- Prevalent in lattice-based crypto
- Public key is $\mathbf{A} = [\mathbf{1} \mid h]$, for $h = g \times f^{-1} \bmod (\varphi, q)$.
- Private key is \mathbf{B} such that $\mathbf{B} \times \mathbf{A}^t = 0 \bmod (\varphi, q)$

Some schemes only require a partial trapdoor $\mathbf{B} = [g \mid -f]$:

- Fiat-Shamir [Zha+17], encryption [Sch+17], FHE [LTV12; Bos+13]

However, some schemes require a full trapdoor $\mathbf{B} = \left[\begin{array}{c|c} g & -f \\ \hline G & -F \end{array} \right]$:

- Hash-then-sign [Pre+17], IBE [DLP14], HIBE [CG17]
- More generally, anything based on trapdoor sampling [GPV08]

Given $f, g \in \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^n + 1)$, we want to find $F, G \in \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^n + 1)$ such that:

$$f \times G - g \times F = q \bmod (x^n + 1) \quad (1)$$

Easy to solve in time $O(n \log n)$ over $\{\mathbb{R}, \mathbb{Z}_q\}[x]/(x^n + 1)$, but not over $\mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^n + 1)$!

The Classical Solvers

- 1 Motivation
- 2 The Classical Solvers**
- 3 A New Solver based on Towers of Rings

The Classical Solvers

Two previous methods:

- A method based on resultants, proposed in [Hof+03] and used in e.g. [DLP14]
- A method based on the Hermite normal form, proposed in [SS11]

Both are extremely costly in time and memory, hard to implement.

Resultant-Based Method

Algorithm 1 Resultant-based NTRU-solver

Require: $f, g \in \mathbb{Z}[x]/(\varphi)$

Ensure: $F, G \in \mathbb{Z}[x]/(\varphi)$ such that $fG - gF = 1$

- 1: Using ext. Euclid, find $\rho_f \in \mathbb{Z}[x]/(\varphi)$ and $R_f \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $\rho_f \times f = R_f$
 - 2: Using ext. Euclid, find $\rho_g \in \mathbb{Z}[x]/(\varphi)$ and $R_g \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $\rho_g \times g = R_g$
 - 3: Using ext. Euclid, find $\alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $\alpha R_f + \beta R_g = 1$
 - 4: $G \leftarrow \alpha \rho_f$
 - 5: $F \leftarrow -\beta \rho_g$
 - 6: Reduce (F, G) with respect to (f, g)
-

A few remarks:

- Steps 1, 2, 3 might fail, in which case we abort the algorithm.
- At the end of step 5, the equation **1** is solved, but the solution (F, G) is huge.
- Step 6 is a Babai round-off reduction of (F, G) with respect to (f, g) .
- Completely agnostic to the structure of the ring $\mathbb{Z}[x]/(\varphi)$.

Resultant-Based Method

Algorithm 1 Resultant-based NTRU-solver

Require: $f, g \in \mathbb{Z}[x]/(\varphi)$

Ensure: $F, G \in \mathbb{Z}[x]/(\varphi)$ such that $fG - gF = 1$

- 1: Using ext. Euclid, find $\rho_f \in \mathbb{Z}[x]/(\varphi)$ and $R_f \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $\rho_f \times f = R_f$
 - 2: Using ext. Euclid, find $\rho_g \in \mathbb{Z}[x]/(\varphi)$ and $R_g \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $\rho_g \times g = R_g$
 - 3: Using ext. Euclid, find $\alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $\alpha R_f + \beta R_g = 1$
 - 4: $G \leftarrow \alpha \rho_f$
 - 5: $F \leftarrow -\beta \rho_g$
 - 6: Reduce (F, G) with respect to (f, g)
-

About the size:

- $R_f = \text{Res}(f, \varphi) = \det(\mathcal{C}(f))$ may be as large as $\|f\|_2^n$
(same remark applies to R_g and $\|g\|_2^n$).
- Each coefficient of ρ_f, ρ_g may be as large as $\|f\|_2^n, \|g\|_2^n$.
- Each coefficient of F, G may be as large as $\|f\|_2^n \times \|g\|_2^n$.

Resultant-Based Method: Example in Sage

```
sage: f
-x^7 + 3*x^6 - x^4 + 4*x^3 + 6*x^2 - 2*x - 4
sage: g
x^7 - x^6 - 2*x^5 - 4*x^3 - 3*x^2 - x + 7
sage: rho_f
-124199*x^7 - 870168*x^6 - 289656*x^5 - 766237*x^4 + 643331*
  x^3 - 1336173*x^2 + 708821*x - 1082620
sage: rho_g
665170*x^7 + 1421014*x^6 + 2065365*x^5 - 2640*x^4 + 1213571*
  x^3 + 682454*x^2 - 648356*x + 3666911
sage: F
3409956090310*x^7 + 7284747273202*x^6 + 10587975946695*x^5 -
  13533809520*x^4 + 6221302557953*x^3 + 3498561531122*x^2
  - 3323760077708*x + 18798210227573
sage: G
-1882599996468*x^7 - 13189947372576*x^6 - 4390585951392*x^5
  - 11614568341884*x^4 + 9751567551492*x^3 -
  20253619474236*x^2 + 10744260518172*x - 16410280341840
```

The State of Affairs

- ➔ Existing methods are slow ($O(n^3)$) and take space $O(n^2)$
- ➔ Existing methods consider the underlying ring as a black-box
- ➔ What happens when we open this black box?



A New Solver based on Towers of Rings

- 1 Motivation
- 2 The Classical Solvers
- 3 A New Solver based on Towers of Rings**

Exploiting the tower of rings structure

We have the following tower of rings:

$$\mathbb{Z} \subseteq \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^2 + 1) \subseteq \cdots \subseteq \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{n/2} + 1) \subseteq \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^n + 1)$$

and the field norm allows to “navigate” along this tower!

Let $\mathcal{Q}_n = \mathbb{Q}[x]/(x^n + 1)$. The field norm N (w.r.t. the extension $\mathcal{Q}_n/\mathcal{Q}_{n/2}$) is defined by:

$$N : \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{Q}_n \rightarrow \mathcal{Q}_{n/2} \\ f \rightarrow ff^\times \end{array} \quad (2)$$

where in our case $f^\times(x) = f(-x)$.

Fun fact: if we have this relationship over $\mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{n/2} + 1)$:

$$N(f)G' - N(g)F' = 1 \quad (3)$$

for some F', G' , then we have this relationship over $\mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^n + 1)$:

$$f(f^\times G') - g(g^\times F') = 1 \quad (4)$$

Outline of the new solver

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^n + 1) & \ni & f, g \\
 \cup \dagger & & \\
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{n/2} + 1) & & \\
 \cup \dagger & & \\
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{n/4} + 1) & & \\
 \cup \dagger & & \\
 \vdots & & \\
 \cup \dagger & & \\
 \mathbb{Z} & &
 \end{array} \tag{5}$$

Outline of the new solver

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^n + 1) & \ni & f, g \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow \\
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{n/2} + 1) & \ni & N(f), N(g) \\
 \cup \dagger & & \\
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{n/4} + 1) & & \\
 \cup \dagger & & \\
 \vdots & & \\
 \cup \dagger & & \\
 \mathbb{Z} & &
 \end{array} \tag{5}$$

Outline of the new solver

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^n + 1) & \ni & f, g \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow \\
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{n/2} + 1) & \ni & N(f), N(g) \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow \\
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{n/4} + 1) & \ni & N^2(f), N^2(g) \\
 \cup \dagger & & \\
 \vdots & & \\
 \cup \dagger & & \\
 \mathbb{Z} & &
 \end{array} \tag{5}$$

Outline of the new solver

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^n + 1) & \ni & f, g \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow \\
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{n/2} + 1) & \ni & N(f), N(g) \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow \\
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{n/4} + 1) & \ni & N^2(f), N^2(g) \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow \\
 \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
 \cup \dagger & & \\
 \mathbb{Z} & &
 \end{array} \tag{5}$$

Outline of the new solver

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^n + 1) & \ni & f, g \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow \\
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{n/2} + 1) & \ni & N(f), N(g) \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow \\
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{n/4} + 1) & \ni & N^2(f), N^2(g) \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow \\
 \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow \\
 \mathbb{Z} & \ni & N^\ell(f), N^\ell(g)
 \end{array} \tag{5}$$

Outline of the new solver

$$\begin{array}{rcccl}
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^n + 1) & \ni & f, g & & \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow & & \\
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{n/2} + 1) & \ni & N(f), N(g) & & \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow & & \\
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{n/4} + 1) & \ni & N^2(f), N^2(g) & & (5) \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow & & \\
 \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & & \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow & & \\
 \mathbb{Z} & \ni & N^\ell(f), N^\ell(g) & \rightarrow & F^{[\ell]}, G^{[\ell]}
 \end{array}$$

Outline of the new solver

$$\begin{array}{rcccl}
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^n + 1) & \ni & f, g & & \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow & & \\
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{n/2} + 1) & \ni & N(f), N(g) & & \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow & & \\
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{n/4} + 1) & \ni & N^2(f), N^2(g) & & \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow & & \\
 \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & & \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow & & \\
 \mathbb{Z} & \ni & N^\ell(f), N^\ell(g) & \rightarrow & F^{[\ell]}, G^{[\ell]}
 \end{array} \tag{5}$$

Outline of the new solver

$$\begin{array}{rccccccc}
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^n + 1) & \ni & f, g & & & & \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow & & & & \\
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{n/2} + 1) & \ni & N(f), N(g) & & & & \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow & & & & \\
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{n/4} + 1) & \ni & N^2(f), N^2(g) & \rightarrow & F^{[2]}, G^{[2]} & & \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow & & \uparrow & & \\
 \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots & & \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow & & \uparrow & & \\
 \mathbb{Z} & \ni & N^\ell(f), N^\ell(g) & \rightarrow & F^{[\ell]}, G^{[\ell]} & & (5)
 \end{array}$$

Outline of the new solver

$$\begin{array}{ccccccc}
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^n + 1) & \ni & f, g & & & & \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow & & & & \\
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{n/2} + 1) & \ni & N(f), N(g) & \rightarrow & F^{[1]}, G^{[1]} & & \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow & & \uparrow & & \\
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{n/4} + 1) & \ni & N^2(f), N^2(g) & \rightarrow & F^{[2]}, G^{[2]} & & \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow & & \uparrow & & \\
 \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots & & \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow & & \uparrow & & \\
 \mathbb{Z} & \ni & N^\ell(f), N^\ell(g) & \rightarrow & F^{[\ell]}, G^{[\ell]} & & (5)
 \end{array}$$

Outline of the new solver

$$\begin{array}{ccccc}
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^n + 1) & \ni & f, g & \rightarrow & F, G \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow & & \uparrow \\
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{n/2} + 1) & \ni & N(f), N(g) & \rightarrow & F^{[1]}, G^{[1]} \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow & & \uparrow \\
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{n/4} + 1) & \ni & N^2(f), N^2(g) & \rightarrow & F^{[2]}, G^{[2]} \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow & & \uparrow \\
 \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow & & \uparrow \\
 \mathbb{Z} & \ni & N^\ell(f), N^\ell(g) & \rightarrow & F^{[\ell]}, G^{[\ell]}
 \end{array} \tag{5}$$

Outline of the new solver

$$\begin{array}{ccccc}
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^n + 1) & \ni & f, g & \rightarrow & F, G \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow & & \uparrow \\
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{n/2} + 1) & \ni & N(f), N(g) & \rightarrow & F^{[1]}, G^{[1]} \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow & & \uparrow \\
 \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{n/4} + 1) & \ni & N^2(f), N^2(g) & \rightarrow & F^{[2]}, G^{[2]} \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow & & \uparrow \\
 \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots \\
 \cup \dagger & & \downarrow & & \uparrow \\
 \mathbb{Z} & \ni & N^\ell(f), N^\ell(g) & \rightarrow & F^{[\ell]}, G^{[\ell]}
 \end{array} \tag{5}$$

At each lower level:

- The coefficients grow (in bitsize) by a factor 2...
- ... but the number of coefficients is divided by 2.

Space-saving trick: recompute lazily $N^i(f), N^i(g)$ at each step

- Allows a linear time-memory trade-off by a factor $\ell = \log n$

The recursive variant (fast)

Algorithm 1 TowerSolver $R_{n,q}(f, g)$

Require: $f, g \in \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^n + 1)$ with n a power of two

Ensure: Polynomials F, G such that the equation 1 is verified

- 1: **if** $n = 1$ **then**
 - 2: Compute $u, v \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $uf - vg = 1$
 - 3: $(F, G) \leftarrow (v, u)$
 - 4: **return** (F, G)
 - 5: **else**
 - 6: $f' \leftarrow N(f)$ $\triangleright f', g', F', G' \in \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{n/2} + 1)$
 - 7: $g' \leftarrow N(g)$
 - 8: $(F', G') \leftarrow \text{TowerSolver}_{n/2,q}(f', g')$
 - 9: $F \leftarrow g^{\times}(x)F'(x^2)$ $\triangleright F, G \in \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^n + 1)$
 - 10: $G \leftarrow f^{\times}(x)G'(x^2)$
 - 11: Reduce (F, G) with respect to (f, g)
 - 12: **return** (F, G)
-

The iterative variant (compact but slower)

Algorithm 2 TowerSolver $l_{n,q}(f, g)$

Require: $f, g \in \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^n + 1)$ with n a power of two

Ensure: Polynomials F, G such that the equation 1 is verified

- 1: $(f', g') \leftarrow (f, g)$
 - 2: **for** $i \leftarrow 1, \dots, \log n$ **do**
 - 3: $(f', g') \leftarrow (N(f'), N(g'))$
 - 4: Compute $u, v \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $uf' - vg' = 1$
 - 5: $(F, G) \leftarrow (v, u)$
 - 6: **for** $i \leftarrow \log n, \dots, 1$ **do**
 - 7: $(f', g') \leftarrow (f, g)$
 - 8: **for** $j \leftarrow 1, \dots, i - 1$ **do**
 - 9: $(f', g') \leftarrow (N(f'), N(g'))$
 - 10: $(F, G) \leftarrow (g'^{\times j} F, f'^{\times j} G)$
 - 11: Reduce (F, G) with respect to (f', g')
 - 12: **return** (F, G)
-

sage: f8, g8

$-x^7 + 3x^6 - x^4 + 4x^3 + 6x^2 - 2x - 4,$
 $x^7 - x^6 - 2x^5 - 4x^3 - 3x^2 - x + 7$

sage: f4, g4

$-51x^3 + 51x^2 - 54x - 17, -33x^3 - 4x^2 - 47x + 57$

sage: f2, g2

$-2049x + 3196, -1576x + 6335$

sage: f1, g1

14412817, 42616001

sage: F1, G1

5126443, 15157932

sage: F2, G2

$2495x - 399, 3844x - 2025$

sage: F4, G4

$-22x^3 + 39x^2 - 23x - 14, -x^3 - 45x + 5$

sage: F8, G8

$-x^7 - x^5 + 3x^4 + 3x^3 - 3x^2 + 4,$
 $2x^7 - x^6 - x^5 - x^4 - 3x^3 + x^2 + x - 4$

Performances

Method	Time complexity ¹	Space complexity ¹
Resultant [Hof+03]	$\tilde{O}(n(n^2 + B))$	$O(n^2B)$
HNF [SS11]	$\tilde{O}(n^3B)$	$O(n^2B)$
This work (Fast)	$O((nB)^{\log_2 3} \log n)$ [Kara] $\tilde{O}(nB)$ [SchöStr]	$O(n(B + \log n) \log n)$
This work (Compact)	$O((nB)^{\log_2 3} \log^2 n)$ [Kara] $\tilde{O}(nB)$ [SchöStr]	$O(n(B + \log n))$

We gain in practice:

- a factor 100 in memory (3 MB → 30 kB)
- a factor 100 in time (2 sec. → 20 msec.)

¹ $B = \log_2 \|(f, g)\|$

Key takeaway

If you cannot trivially exploit the presence of a ring...



... try to use its particular structure!

Thanks!



Joppe W. Bos et al. "Improved Security for a Ring-Based Fully Homomorphic Encryption Scheme". In: *14th IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding*. Ed. by Martijn Stam. Vol. 8308. LNCS. Springer, Heidelberg, Dec. 2013, pp. 45–64. DOI: [10.1007/978-3-642-45239-0_4](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45239-0_4).



Peter Campbell and Michael Groves. *Practical Post-Quantum Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption*. 16th IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding. <http://www.qub.ac.uk/sites/CSIT/FileStore/Filetoupload,785752,en.pdf>. 2017.



Léo Ducas, Vadim Lyubashevsky, and Thomas Prest. "Efficient Identity-Based Encryption over NTRU Lattices". In: *ASIACRYPT 2014, Part II*. Ed. by Palash Sarkar and Tetsu Iwata. Vol. 8874. LNCS. Springer, Heidelberg, Dec. 2014, pp. 22–41. DOI: [10.1007/978-3-662-45608-8_2](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45608-8_2).



Craig Gentry, Chris Peikert, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. "Trapdoors for hard lattices and new cryptographic constructions". In: *40th ACM STOC*. Ed. by Richard E. Ladner and Cynthia Dwork. ACM Press, May 2008, pp. 197–206. DOI: [10.1145/1374376.1374407](https://doi.org/10.1145/1374376.1374407).



Jeffrey Hoffstein et al. "NTRUSIGN: Digital Signatures Using the NTRU Lattice". In: *CT-RSA 2003*. Ed. by Marc Joye. Vol. 2612. LNCS. Springer, Heidelberg, Apr. 2003, pp. 122–140. DOI: [10.1007/3-540-36563-x_9](https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36563-x_9).



Adriana López-Alt, Eran Tromer, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. “On-the-fly multiparty computation on the cloud via multikey fully homomorphic encryption”. In: *44th ACM STOC*. Ed. by Howard J. Karloff and Toniann Pitassi. ACM Press, May 2012, pp. 1219–1234. DOI: [10.1145/2213977.2214086](https://doi.org/10.1145/2213977.2214086).



Thomas Prest et al. *FALCON*. Tech. rep. available at <https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography/round-1-submissions>. National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2017.



John M. Schanck et al. *NTRU-HRSS-KEM*. Tech. rep. available at <https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography/round-1-submissions>. National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2017.



Damien Stehlé and Ron Steinfeld. “Making NTRU as Secure as Worst-Case Problems over Ideal Lattices”. In: *EUROCRYPT 2011*. Ed. by Kenneth G. Paterson. Vol. 6632. LNCS. Springer, Heidelberg, May 2011, pp. 27–47. DOI: [10.1007/978-3-642-20465-4_4](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20465-4_4).



Zhenfei Zhang et al. *pqNTRUSign*. Tech. rep. available at <https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography/round-1-submissions>. National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2017.